第1页共12页编号:时间:2021年x月x日书山有路勤为径,学海无涯苦作舟页码:第1页共12页原文:Family-FirmBuyouts,PrivateEquity,andStrategicChangeTheEuropeanprivateequityandbuyoutmarket'hasgrowninprominenceoverrecentyears.TheCentreforManagementBuyoutResearch(CMBOR,2008)hasshownthattheannualnumberofmanagementbuyoutsrosefroml212in1998to1,436bytheendof2007.Buyoutsoffamilyfirmsrepresentoneofthemostimportantfeaturesofthismarket,withthenumberofdealsincreasingfrom45in1998to559in2007andthecombinedvaluefrom11.2billionto18,3billionoverthesameperiod.In2007familyfirmscontributed38%ofthenumberand11%ofthevalueofthewholeEuropeanbuyoutmarket.Managementbuyouts(MBO)andbuy-ins(MBI)thusrepresentanimportantsuccessionoptioninfamilyfirms.Theyalsoprovideanimportantdealsourceforprivateequityfirms.Yet,whilemuchattentionintheprivateequityandbuyoutmarkethasbeenonlargepublic-to-privatetransactions,thefamilybuyoutpartofthemarketisnotwellunderstood(Cumming,SiegelandWright,2007).Thefocusinlargepublic-to-privatetransactionsanddivisionalbuyoutshasbeenontheresolutionofincentiveandcontrolproblemsthroughtheintroductionofnewownershipandgovernancestructuresintheformofmanagerialequityownership,commitmentandpressuretoservicedebt,andinmanycasesownershipandactiveinvolvementbyprivateequityfirms(WrightandBruining,2008).Incontrast,thetypicalfamilyfirmhastraditionallybeenassumedtobeownedandmanagedbyaconcentratedgroupoffamilymemberswherethefirm'sobjectivesarecloselylinkedtofamilyobjectives.Familiestypicallydonotregardtheirfirmsasmereeconomicunitspursuingthegoalofprofitmaximization.Instead,familiesalsostrivefornoneconomicgoals.Asaresult,thetightnessofgripofafamilyoveritsfirmaddsanimportantdimensiontotheanalysisofthestrategiesoffamilyfirms.Thechangesoccurringonthebuyoutofafamilyfirmmayleadtochangesingoalsandstrategiescomparedtothepreviousownershipregime,andthesestrategic第2页共12页第1页共12页编号:时间:2021年x月x日书山有路勤为径,学海无涯苦作舟页码:第2页共12页changesmayinfluencefirmsurvivalorfailure.Thechangeinstrategyismotivatedbyoneofthefollowingtwofactors;first,thefirmmayhavebeenunderperformingandnewstrategiesmustbeadoptedtocorrectthis(efficiencybuyout).Second,thenewownerswillhavethefreedomtopursuetheirowninterestsintermsofbusinessdirectionand/ordiversification(growth/expansionbuyout).Thepresenceoffounders,shareholdingnon-familymanagers,ornonfamilynon-executivedirectorsontheboardmayhavedifferenteffectsonthebuyoutprocessandonthebusinessstrategiesadoptedbeforeandafterthebuyout.Changesinstrategyarealsoduetotheownershipandgovernanceofthefirmbeforethebuyoutaswellasthenewfinancialstructureandtheneedtomeetresultantservicingcosts.Inlightoftheseissues,thepurposeofthisarticleistwofold;1.Weprovideanoverviewofdevelopmentsinthefamily-firmbuyoutmarket.Specifically,weexaminetrendsinthenumberandvalueofdeals,dealsizes,shareofthetotalbuyoutmarket,employment,andtheroleofprivateequity.WeuseCMBOR'suniquedatabasecomprisingthepopulationof30,000Europeanbuyoutsasthesourceforthisanalysis.2.Weundertakeadetailedstudyofstrategicchangesinfamilyfirmsasaresultofabuyout.Specifically,weexaminewhetherchangesinthestrategyofformerprivatefamilyfirmsareaffectedbytheownershipandgovernanceofthefirmbeforethebuyout.Theseissuesareexaminedusinganovelhand-collectedrepresentativequestionnairesurveyof104privatefamilyfirmsacrossEuropewhichhadabuyoutfundedbyprivateeq...