摘 要改革开放四十年来，我国民营经济飞速发展，取得了令人瞩目的成果，但仍面临融资难融资贵等问题。面对这些难题，民营企业开始寻求与政府建立政治关联作为替代保护机制。民营企业通过政治寻租等方式获得的相关经济利益，往往不能直接表现在财务报表上，企业管理者通过盈余管理手段进行掩盖。盈余管理行为在一定程度上会降低企业会计信息质量，影响会计信息使用者的判断，因此研究政治关联与民营企业盈余管理的相关性显得十分必要。 本文通过对 2013-2017 年中小板民营上市公司的调查统计，以及民营企业寻求政治关联的动机分析，发现民营企业的政治关联强度较大，政治关联作为一种担保，可以帮助民营企业获得更多政策优惠和融资帮助。本文在借鉴文献和收集资料的基础上，通过实证分析来验证政治关联与民营企业盈余管理的相关性。研究发现民营企业普遍存在盈余管理行为，政治关联与民营企业的应计盈余管理呈负相关，与真实盈余管理呈正相关。表明政治关联能减弱民营企业的应计盈余管理水平，促进民营企业转向真实盈余管理。基于以上结论，本文提出了相应的政策建议，对民营企业和资本市场的治理具有一定启示。关键词：政治关联；盈余管理；民营企业ABSTRACTIn the past 40 years of reform and opening up, private economy has developed rapidly and achieved remarkable results, but it still faces the problems of difficult financing and expensive financing. Faced with these problems, private enterprises began to seek to establish political connections with the government as an alternative protection mechanism. The relevant economic benefits obtained by private enterprises through political rent-seeking are often not directly reflected in the financial statements, and managers of private enterprises cover them up by means of earnings management. Earnings management will reduce the quality of accounting information and affect the judgment of accounting information users to a certain extent. Therefore, it is necessary to study the correlation between political connection and earnings management of private enterprises.Based on the inve...
